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Abstract
In this study we investigate how cost efficiency and risk affect market share in 
European banking industry. Our analysis is motivated by the well-known efficiency 
hypothesis and structure-conduct-performance theory. We hypothesize that 
improved efficiency and enhanced riskiness of a bank should be related to an 
increase in its market share. Therefore, in contrast to other studies, we include risk 
as a determinant of market share. In the study we use annual data for 36 European 
countries’ banks for the time span from 2007 to 2015. The results reveal that risk 
and efficiency are positively associated with market share of assets, loans and 
deposits. Additionally, we find that banks in transition countries were less 
successful in transposing their cost efficiency advantages into market share gains 
than banks in European developed countries. The empirical model is estimated by 
using the GMM method in order to account for dynamic nature of investigated 
components and to mitigate the endogeneity problem. 
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1. Introduction3
Competition for market share has traditionally been considered a source of 
excessive risk taking in the banking industry (Matutes and Vives, 2000). An 
increase in market share is usually considered as a strategy that afterwards allows 
firms to earn higher profits (Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan, 1975). For regulators and 
academics it is important to determine how firms increase market share: is it 
through efficiency or risk taking? These views are associated with the efficiency 
hypothesis (EH) and Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP); both these views have 
policy implications if a regulator tries to intervene; the first suggests that policies 
against concentration might affect efficiency and as a result welfare; the second 
suggests that concentration may induce collusion, and as result, welfare loss. Thus, 
the weight of the market structure of banking systems is very relevant because 
of the firms’ access to funds and their investment (González, 2009). Moreover, 
elevation of the market share of large banks tends to make smaller banks instable 
(Kim, Park, and Song, 2016).
In this study we ask how market share of total assets, loans and deposits in the 
banking industry increases, is it with higher risk taking and/or with higher efficiency. 
Market share measures the share that a bank holds in the market where it operates. 
Given that the banking industry is regulated and there are barriers to entry, demand 
is not horizontal, implying that banks may have some market power. Hence, banks 
are inclined to increase market share because that will enable them to earn abnormal 
profits. The game race between banks, as to which one can accumulate capital or 
increase market share faster, happens because banks are constrained by their capital 
(Allen and Gale, 2004). Thus, the market share strategy is an important factor for 
banks, because managers might think that the effect of their activities will have an 
impact not only on immediate profit but also on their future position in the market. 
Although, the future position of a bank depends on risk taking and/or cost efficiency 
and on the behavior of other banks. Managers can pursue the target of increasing 
market share, by issuing loans without proper screening, increase interest rates on 
deposits, and not monitoring the performance of loan takers, knowing that screening 
and monitoring are important for understanding the strategies (Francis, Hasan, Küllü, 
and Zhou, 2018). All these actions will eventually increase market share in the banking 
industry, but the risk for default will be much higher. On the other hand, banks can 
increase their market share by being more efficient, and as a result have an advantage 
on pricing; or they can differentiate themselves by providing a better quality service. 
This study examines how banks in European countries increase their market share 
and how this is related to efficiency and risk taking. We extended previous research 
3 This article is part of PhD dissertation with title “Efficiency and Market Structure of Banking Industry 
in Southeast Europe”, it was modified for publication.
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on market structure by including the risk variable that was derived from a utility 
maximization model suggested by Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon(1996). The 
risk variable is defined as the standard deviation of expected returns, a model which 
allows banking managers to choose the input factors given their expected return 
and standard deviation of expected return (Hughes et al., 2000). This allows us 
to check if the risk-taking is correlated with market share. Moreover, we check if 
there is any difference between the banks in transition countries and the European 
developed countries regarding the market share. Furthermore, we include cost 
efficiency score, which we derive through the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), 
as an independent variable to check if the market share is correlated with efficiency. 
In order to examine effects of efficiency and risk better, we control for mergers and 
acquisition within the country and other environment variables.
This paper contributes to the literature by trying to answer the question, how cost 
efficiency and risk taking affect the market share. We extended the previous work of 
González (2009) and Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) by including the risk variable 
and cost efficiency scores. We found that risk in a previous period is correlated with 
market share in the current period. Moreover, we found that efficiency is correlated 
with market share of assets, loans and deposits. We have estimated the model using 
the GMM model in order to account for dynamics and to avoid the endogeneity 
problem. We have used annual data for 36 European countries’ banks for the years 
2007–2015, because it covers the post crisis period. During this period many 
inefficient banks have been trying to improve cost efficiency (Nurboja and Košak, 
2017) and some banks engaged in mergers and acquisitions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a literature review 
on banking market structure. Section 3 covers the methodology and data. The 
results are interpreted in Section 4. The last Section includes the conclusions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Risk-taking in the context of market share
The agency costs theory explains that when firms are financed by debt, managers 
acting in the shareholders’ interests have an incentiveto take higher risk, because 
the debt holders bear the risk if things go wrong while the shareholders benefit if 
things succeed(Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Thus, banking managers are inclined to take higher risk and expect that to be 
translated into higher market share and ultimately to lead to higher profit. Hence, 
their compensation schemes are linked to the performance.
The risk-expected return trade-off is determined by the investment strategy that 
banking managers choose (Hughes and Mester, 2013). The decision taken by 
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banking managers depends on their utility function, which is a function of 
expected return and its standard deviation.  Banks exogenously may set the 
level of risk they take on their investments and the intensity of monitoring 
and screening (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). If these decisions affect the market 
share, then we may conclude that the banks are not risk neutral, hence the banks 
through higher market share may tend to rise the profitability. Zamore,Djan, 
Alon, and Hobdari(2018) found six streams of risk measurement which were 
used in different models. In our case, we will use as risk the standard deviation of 
expected return as suggested by (DeYoung, Hughes, and Moon, 2001; Hughes et 
al., 2000; Hughes and Mester, 2013).
Some authors, for example Pawlowska (2016), treat market share as explanatory 
variable in relation to risk, whereas the relation should be vice versa. The 
decisions of banking managers that are related to risk could affect market share, 
for example to increase the interest rate for deposits, is a risky decision that may 
cause an increase on market share of deposits, due to higher supply of deposits for 
that particular bank. Or, if banking managers decide not to utilize the screening 
instruments of potential borrowers, they may increase the market share of loans. 
Indeed, there may be a lag before the risk taking affects the market share, because 
any decision that the bank manager takes needs time to have an effect. In this 
context, we included the risk on the right-hand side as a predetermined variable 
and hypothesize that the lag risk affects market share in current period.
2.2. Efficiency hypothesis in market share context
Efficiency hypothesis implies that firms increase their market share because they 
are efficient in comparison to their peers. Therefore examination of the market 
structure in banking is important because optimal allocation of resources may 
be altered. Researchers and policymaker have put great effort into determining 
what policies should be implemented in the banking industries regarding the 
concentration, given their importance. Many authors have tried to measure market 
structure by examining the variation of profitability in relation to concentration or 
market share. Thus, the market structure variables were considered as exogenous 
variables. For example Mirzaei, Moore, and Liu (2013) used market share to 
explain variation of profitability for advanced and transition economies. Some 
studies where market share was treated as endogenous are Berger and Hannan 
(1998) and Berger (1995); they claimed that market share can be explained only 
by scale efficiency in the US banking market. For Europe, Goldberg and Rai 
(1996) claimed that there is no relation between efficiency and market structure. 
Many other studies have tried to investigate this relationship, however, some of 
them support the efficiency hypothesis but some find no correlation of efficiency 
with market share.
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Banks, like all other firms, compete for market share, on the assumption that will 
result in market power4, either by taking higher risk and waiting for reward or by 
being more efficient than their peers and as result gain market share. Concentration 
in the industry is correlated with the efficiency, affirming that the most efficient 
banks obtain higher market shares, because, banks that operate more efficiently than 
their peers are able to lower their prices or provide better service and as result gain 
market share (Boulding and Staelin, 1990; Demsetz, 1973). In contrast, Berger and 
Hannan (1998) tested the “quiet life hypothesis5” for banking industry in the US 
and found that banks in more concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency. 
This raises the question: how do banks increase their market share? Is it by 
investing in the high risk projects6? And/Or, do the managers work very efficiently 
by offering more competitive pricing of better products, which they can afford due 
to greater cost of efficiency, and can therefore increase their market share? We can 
assume that banks compete for market share, because the bank that manages to get 
the largest share might be able to exploit its market power to increase profitability. 
In contrast to aforementioned studies, we tried to examine what affects market share 
of assets, loans and deposits. Since some studies treated efficiency as endogenous, 
we have decided to include lagged efficiency scores, because the efficiency in the 
current period might affect market share in the future period. Thus, we hypothesize 
that efficiency is correlated with the market shares. In addition, given that, in our 
sample, we have banks from transition countries and European developed countries, 
where the institutional settings may differ, we investigate how efficiency affects 
the market share of banks in these groups of countries. Moreover, knowing that 
banks are mostly financed by debt, according to the agency theory we would expect 
that bank managers are inclined to take risk in the interests of their shareholders 
and at the expense of debt holder. If the risk consequences do not occur, the bank 
managers claim the reward. Consequently, we expect that risk taking is related with 
market share.
In sum, many studies have tried to measure market structure, but, to our knowledge, 
there are no studies that have included efficiency and risk in one model to determine 
market share. Moreover, our study covers a large set of European countries, which 
will offer new insight regarding the market structure.
4 Industrial Organization literature suggests that the higher the market power firms possess, the more 
they will be able to increase markup.
5 This hypothesis postulates that the higher the market power, the lower the effort of managers to 
maximize operating efficiency.
6 Risky project not only applies to new investment, but to the operation process as well. For example, 
not hiring enough loan officers to monitor borrowers can be regarded as a risky investment; hence, 
if loans do not default, the bank will earn more, or if more loan officers are employed, then they can 
better screen and monitor the firms.
Bashkim Nurboja, Marko Košak • Cost efficiency and risk as determinants of market... 
504 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2019 • vol. 37 • no. 2 • 499-525
3. Methodology 
In this model, equation (1), we will try to measure how market share is affected 
by risk and efficiency. We use two models, fixed effect and GMM. The risk scores 
was generated by using model of Hughes et al. (2000) and Hughes et al. (1996) (for 
more details how risk is measured see Appendix 1). The risk is represented by the 
standard deviation of the expected return of the banks. The risk was included as an 
independent variable in order to measure whether risk-taking influences the market 
share. The cost efficiency scores will be measured using the stochastic frontier 







MS (market share) represents a vector of market shares of a bank ith associated with 
Total Assets, Loans and Deposits at time t. In our case we transformed the market 
share variables into natural logarithms in order to improve normality of the variable. 
The risk, depending on which market share we measure, may have different effects. 
The higher risk may be ambivalent; hence the banking managers increase banking 
assets by taking a higher risk that may translate into a higher market share or if 
the risk-taking fails market share may contract. In the context of market share of 
deposits, we may expect ambivalent relation with risk; if the market could read 
the risk taken, the market share of deposit may contract due to market discipline. 
The risk lag was included because we may expect that the risk taken in the current 
period may influence the market share in next period. 
The EF and EF lag stand for cost efficiency scores. The efficiency hypothesis claims 
that market share and efficiency are endogenous because efficiency in the current 
period may affect market share in the next period (González, 2009). Also, as “quite- 
life hypothesis” states that market share may affect the efficiency in negative way, 
or the efficiency may be affected positively by market share through the economy 
of scale. Therefore, we used system GMM and introduced a lag EF to solve the 
problem of endogeneity. Several papers supported the efficiency hypothesis view 
that efficiency is associated with market share in the banking sector (Chortareas, 
Garza-Garcia, and Girardone, 2011; González, 2009). However, in the banking 
sector, which is a regulated industry, the banks with higher efficiencies may not be 
able to exploit its market power.
The ID stands for income diversification. Banks that diversify their income more 
may have a lower market share on loans because they shift resources to other 
outputs. Thus, we expect that ID will be negatively correlated with market share 
of loans. The ID may be ambivalent with market share of assets, because the 
resources that were allocated to other earning assets depend on marginal revenue of 
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units allocated to other earning assets. In terms of market share of deposits, the ID 
may have ambivalent effect, because that may depend how depositors perceive the 
riskiness of invested assets that generate other income.
The merger and acquisition (M&A) were included in order to account for rapid 
market share gain, which is not captured from risk and efficiency. The M&A were 
identified only within the country; we have not accounted for cross-border M&A, 
because we measure market share of the level of each country. We also have 
estimated the equation (1) without inclusion of M&A where we assumed that some 
managerial decisions to undertake M&A are risky.
The h is a vector of variables that we have included to control for heterogeneity. 
We estimated equation (1) using three specifications. In each specification we used 
different market share as dependent variable. We have included the dummy for 
banking systems of transition countries (1, otherwise zero), where the benchmark 
is banks in the European developed countries. We expect that banks in transition 
countries gain market share more slowly than banks in the European developed 
countries as result of efficiency because of financial reforms and quality of 
institutions (Delis, 2012). Thus, we have included an interaction between group of 
banks from transition countries and efficiency. In order to control for heterogeneity 
between countries we controlled for size of economy by including the GDP 
(natural logarithm of GDP) and for financial development by including banks’ 
assets7 to GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-kunt, and Levine, 2000). The ε is a disturbance 
term normally distributed ε ~ N(0, σ2). In addition to the fixed effect model, we 
use system GMM model in order to avoid endogeneity problem and account for 
dynamics (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).The instruments 
that the GMM system uses for endogeneity are verifiable by means of the Sargan 
test, where the null hypothesis states that overidentifying restrictions are valid 
cannot be rejected (see Table 2 and Table 3).
4. Empirical data and analysis
In this study we use annual banking data for 576 commercial banks from 36 European 
countries for the period 2007–2015. The data were collected through Bankscope; data 
were converted to the currencies to Euros and adjusted for inflation as the base year 
was taken 2007 through the Bankscope platform. Country level data were obtained 
from World Bank Data. The banks that were not active have been omitted. The 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, we have divided the sample of banking 
systems into transition countries8 and European developed countries.
7 The sum of all banks assets in year tfor a particular country divided by its GDP for the same year.
8 Transtion countires are considered all the countries in the sample that undergone through a regime 
change. For details, please see appendix no. 5.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables for transition and European developed 
countries
 
Transition Countries European developed countries All
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
Dependent variables
Market share of assets 0.080 0.092 0.002 0.522 0.059 0.138 0.003 0.487 0.070 0.125
Market share of deposits 0.088 0.101 0.002 0.531 0.061 0.136 0.001 0.466 0.071 0.126
Market share of loans 0.086 0.103 0.003 0.533 0.060 0.134 0.002 0.457 0.070 0.124
Independent Variables
Risk# 0.013 0.008 0.003 0.120 0.022 0.024 0.002 0.270 0.017 0.020
Efficiency$ 0.812 0.100 0.081 1.000 0.827 0.088 0.358 0.989 0.812 0.097
Income diversification 0.431 0.318 0.280 0.983 0.482 0.252 0.02 0.986 0.438 0.306
GDP* 231 291 7.2 1435 1470 917 121 3540 876 934
Asset to GDP 0.381 0.277 0.037 1.677 2.236 1.152 0.351 5.355 1.363 1.259
HHI Assets 2876 1361 876 9120 1810 935 872 8111 2371 1293
Note: #Risk is generated according to Hughes et al.,(2000), check appendix 1; $Efficiency is cost 
efficiency that was generated through the stochastic frontier approach(Battese & Coelli, 
1995), check appendix 2; *GDP is in billions of €.
Source: Bankscope, World Bank and authors’ estimations 
The market shares of assets, market share of deposits and market share of loans 
were estimated (MS = Asset of the Bankit/∑i=1
n Assets of the Bankst where n is the 
number of banks within the national markets t=2007,…, 2015). The risk variable 
measures standard deviation of expected return, which was derived according to 
the Hughes et al., (2000) and Koetter (2008). Inclusion of risk will try to capture 
the risky decisions that managers make to maximize their utility function (check 
appendix 1). In terms of efficiency, we used stochastic frontier approach as 
suggested by Battes and Coelli (1995) to derive efficiency scores, then we include 
the efficiency score variable as independent variable (for details check appendix 2). 
The income diversification was estimated according to Laeven and Levine (2007).
 
This index can take values from zero to one, where zero means that the bank 
has a solely one stream of income. The higher the index, the greater the income 
diversifications. 
As we can notice from Table 1 the market share on average is higher in transition 
countries than European developed countries, whereas, efficiency is higher in the 
European developed countries at the statistical significance. Thus, we argue that 
inclusion of interaction between efficiency and group of banking systems would 
show if there is a difference in speed of market share gains through the efficiency. 
Bashkim Nurboja, Marko Košak • Cost efficiency and risk as determinants of market... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2019 • vol. 37 • no. 2 • 499-525 507
There is a difference in financial development between these groups of countries; 
the asset to GDP ratio shows that European developed countries have much higher 
financial development than transition countries. In Appendix 3 we have presented 
the correlation matrix table of variables. The correlation between market share 
variables of assets, loans and deposits is above 0.9. 
In order to control for the M&A effect we had to identify mergers and acquisitions 
within national markets. Therefore we introduced M&A dummy variable that 
takes value of 1 in case a domestic M&A occurred and value of 0 otherwise. 
In our sample we have identified 17 M&A during the period 2007–2015 (see 
Appendix4 for country by country). In our identification process of M&A, we 
have arbitrarily taken a change 0.05 in market share of assets of a bank as the 
basis for filtering data. Only two banks appeared to have a change of market 
share of assets of more than 0.05. Then we have investigated the websites of 
those banks and press releases for those particular years, in order to confirm that 
M&A occurred. We decreased the change in market share of assets to 0.04 as the 
criterion for filtering. The number of banks that appeared was 22. From 22 banks 
we found out that only 17 had undertaken M&A. After we decreased the change 
in market share of assets to 0.03 and filtered the database, 37 banks appeared, but 
none of the additional banks had undertaken any M&A activities. Thus, only for 
these 17banks we have included a dummy variable from the year that M&A took 
place.
The estimated empirical models are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. We noticed 
persistence in the dynamic parameters of the dependent variables, where the 
market share increase in the previous period affects the market share in the current 
period. Moreover, the results show that lagged risk is positively associated with 
the market share in three specifications. The parameter of current risk with the 
GMM model appeared not to be significant, except for market share of deposits 
in Table 2. These results confirm our hypothesis that the risk affects the market 
share. 
We see that income diversification is one of the drivers that explains market share 
but not in the same way for all the dependent variables. Income diversification 
appeared negatively correlated with market share of loans and significant. In case 
of GDP and financial development (Assets to GDP) the relation is negative with 
market share and in most cases it is significant. This shows that, as economic and 
financial development increases, market share decreases. This results are in line 
with González (2009). 
In Table 2 we show differences for the group of banking systems from transition 
countries compared with those from European developed countries in interaction 
with efficiency. The results reveal that banks in transition countries translate 
efficiency to market share slower than banks from European developed countries. 
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The parameter estimated with the transition countries dummy (TC) turns out to be 
strictly significant and positive in all specifications, which indicates a persistent 
tendency towards greater market shares in banking industries of the transition 
countries included in the study.
Table 2: Estimated result with M&A
Dependent variable
Fixed effect System GMM
MS assets MS loans MS deposits MS assets MS loans MS deposits
MS Assetst-1 0.986*** 0.954***
(0.004) (0.050)
MS Loanst-1 0.985*** 1.011***
(0.004) (0.075)
MS Depositst-1 0.994*** 1.056***
(0.007) (0.037)
Risk 1.175*** 0.881** 2.749*** 0.663 0.207 1.714*
(0.313) (0.345) (0.546) (0.452) (0.583) (0.836)
Riskt-1 1.321*** 0.881* 2.168*** 1.442*** 1.165* 1.439*
(0.308) (0.344) (0.532) (0.397) (0.469) (0.720)
Efficiency 0.229** 0.051** 0.121 0.192** 0.096 0.045*
(0.112) (0.024) (0.177) (0.080) (0.220) (0.028)
Efficiencyt-1 0.230** 0.153* 0.164*** 0.183*** 0.382** 0.115***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.053) (0.024) (0.157) (0.038)
ID 0.067* -0.002*** 0.004 0.356*** -0.112** 0.341**
(0.030) (0.000) (0.053) (0.055) (0.063) (0.106)
GDP -0.001* -0.020** -0.001 -0.011** -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset to GDP -0.024* -0.014** 0.010 -0.134*** -0.106* -0.031
(0.010) (0.004) (0.018) (0.031) (0.043) (0.058)
TC# 0.056* 0.109*** 0.285*** 0.099*** 0.667** 1.470**
(0.029) (0.018) (0.094) (0.037) (0.305) (0.612)
Transition*efficiency -0.101* -0.098*** -0.308* -0.294*** -0.319** -0.377*
(0.068) (0.028) (0.191) (0.042) (0.136) (0.229)
M&A& 0.092* 0.113* 0.098 0.750*** 0.508*** 0.691***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.075) (0.107) (0.135) (0.208)
Constant -3.675*** -4.010*** -3.884*** 0.387 0.706* 1.401**
(0.267) (0.274) (0.380) (0.395) (0.303) (0.491)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.36 0.25 0.30
AR 1 (p-value) (0.011) (0.031) (0.039)




Note: #Transition countries; &Mergers and Acquisitions, a list of the countries in the sample 
is provided in Appendix4; Standard errors are given in parentheses and *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
Source: Authors 
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The banks that have undertaken merger and acquisitions, when compared with the 
banks that have not undertaken any mergers and acquisitions during this period 
haveon average higher market share in all specifications. This shows that big banks 
try tofurther increase the market sharethrough the M&A, which leads to higher 
market concentration in the banking industry.
Table 3: Estimated results without M&A
Dependent Variable 
Fixed effect System GMM
MS assets MS loans MS deposits MS assets MS loans MS deposits
MS Assetst-1 0.988*** 0.958***
(0.004) (0.019)
MS Loanst-1 0.987*** 0.943***
(0.004) (0.073)
MS Depositst-1 0.997*** 1.235***
(0.007) (0.052)
Risk 1.150*** 0.859* 2.733*** 0.757 0.477 0.590
(0.313) (0.346) (0.545) (0.448) (0.554) (0.953)
Riskt-1 1.324*** 0.907** 2.180*** 1.464*** 1.049* 2.126**
(0.308) (0.346) (0.532) (0.386) (0.457) (0.792)
Efficiency 0.266** 0.116** 0.278* 0.335* 0.123* 0.099*
(0.098) (0.054) (0.150) (0.140) (0.066) (0.058)
Efficiencyt-1 0.237** 0.150* 0.182* 0.105*** 0.443** 0.163***
(0.089) (0.083) (0.112) (0.026) (0.152) (0.036)
ID 0.072** -0.004* 0.020* 0.240*** -0.095** 0.143*
(0.031) (0.002) (0.011) (0.059) (0.041) (0.082)
GDP -0.001** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asset to GDP -0.017* -0.008 0.009 -0.159*** -0.113* -0.051
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.027) (0.044) (0.062)
TC# 0.237*** 0.117*** 0.165*** 1.659*** 0.328** 3.253**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.020) (0.374) (0.162) (1.021)
TC*efficiency -0.035*** -0.022** -0.005** -0.274** -0.322* -0.699
(0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.138) (0.185) (0.544)
 HHI of assets 0.018* 0.008** 0.007* 0.178* 0.076* 0.097**
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.099) (0.039) (0.043)
Constant -0.038 -0.018 0.021 1.094*** 0.216 2.373***
(0.081) (0.087) (0.143) (0.208) (0.323) (0.627)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.32 0.31 0.34
AR 1 (p-value) (0.021) (0.031) (0.038)
AR 2 (p-value) (0.389) (0.401) (0.354)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) (0.378) (0.398) (0.534)
Note: #Transition countries; a List of the countries in the sample is provided in Appendix 5; 
Standard errors are given in parentheses and *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
Source: Authors
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In Table 3 we have estimated the equation (1) without M&A and the results have 
appeared quite consistent with the results in Table 2. We also have included HHI 
to account for competition, but still the results show that banks from transition 
countries cannot translate the efficiency into the market share at the same pace as 
banks from European developed countries. 
In the fixed effect model we have included country fixed effect, in order to avoid 
the country idiosyncratic characteristics. The hypothesis that the error term is not 
correlated cannot be rejected, which is shown by the Sargan-Hansen test for all 
three specifications. This implies that lags of efficiency used as instrument produce 
efficient estimators (Roodman, 2009). The AR (1) first order serial correlation is 
significant and AR (2) second order serial correlations is not significant. Thus, we 
continued with one lag as a dependent variable.
5. Results and discussion
In this study we analyze market share determinants in European banking industry 
and more specifically how cost efficiency and risk are related to changes in market 
shares. The results show that risk taken by banks in period t-1 is on average 
related to the contemporary market share of banks and in all model specifications 
this relationship was positive and significant. This finding may imply that higher 
risk taking by banks actually leads to increased market shares, which capacitates 
banks to enhance their profitability. However, as financial theory suggests the risk 
function is not expected to be linear, therefore the strategy of higher risk taking 
may not be advisable. In any case the risk mitigation techniques such as screening 
and monitoring should be in place and used adequately. 
On the other hand, bank cost efficiency, estimated by the stochastic frontier 
approach, appears to be positively related to market share in the current period 
as well as in the period t-1, which indicates that the efficiency hypothesis holds 
for these data and on average more cost efficient banks tend to dominate the 
markets. Consequently, policy makers should take into account this effect while 
addressing the market structure in the banking industry and thus detected elevated 
concentration rates, due to prevalence of superiorly efficient banks, can be tolerated, 
if the bank customers and other stakeholders benefit from the raised efficiency 
levels.
As regards the income diversification, a dedicated index shows that income 
diversification is positively related to market share of assets and deposits, but 
negatively to market share of loans, implying that banks that try to diversify their 
income streams, do so, by shifting output from loans to other earning assets.This 
observation is in line with our expectation and with a study by Efthyvoulou and 
Yildirim (2014), where they hypothesize that income diversification may occur due 
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to a shift of resources fromloan production to other earning assets. In contrast to 
market share of loans, where estimated coefficient was negative, we observed that 
income diversification positively influenced market share of deposits and assets. 
Thus, a bank may increase income diversification as long as opportunity costs 
from shifting resources from loans to other earning assets are lower than income 
generated from other earning assets.
Our comparison of banking markets in transition countries with those in 
developed European countries shows that banks in transition countries on average 
havegreatermarket share than banks in the rest of Europe. By including the 
interaction terms in our empirical model, we find that banks in transition countries 
do not gain market share through efficiency as quickly as other European banks 
do. This may be due to the higher concentration rates of the banking industry in 
transition countries, where prices tend to be more rigid (Heggestad and Mingo, 
1976). This particular finding indicates transition countries’ banking sectors being 
characterized by distinctively more concentrated market structures, which very 
likely reflects differences in competitiveness and institutional settings between 
transition countries and economically more developed countries. One explanation 
for this result might be in the findings of Delis (2012), who discovered that banking 
competition did not improve at the same pace in countries with weaker institutions 
and lower levels of economic development, which was typically the case with 
the transitions countries in Europe. Additionally, our result could be also due to 
higher concentration of banking industries in transition countries (see HHI index in 
Table 1), which in turn might make prices more rigid (Berstein and Fuentes, 2005; 
Heggestad and Mingo, 1976).
We were also able to control for the M&A effects in our study, which we consider 
as an especially valuable contribution of our study. As expected, the banks, that 
underwent M&A in the observed period, on average controlled larger market shares 
than banks that have not been involved in any M&As. This indicates that we can 
expect bigger banks tend to grow even bigger and consequently the market getting 
more concentrated.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we have examined what affects market share in the banking industry 
of 36 European countries for the period 2007–2015. Our main goal was to examine, 
how risk and efficiency affect market share of assets, loans and deposits. In addition 
to fixed effects, in order to avoid endogeneity between market share and efficiency, 
we used GMM. We found that an increase in risk in the previous period affects 
market share in the current period. In the fixed effects model the risk appeared 
significant, in contrast to the GMM model. This implies that banks can make risky 
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decisions by not using the instruments of screening and monitoring and that may 
contribute to increase in the market share. However, how these decisions may 
influence costs of the bank in future, is beyond this research. 
The efficiency hypothesis holds for our data, proving that efficiency is correlated 
with market share. We showed that the lag efficiency is also positively related with 
market share, implying that an increase in efficiency in the current period will affect 
market share in the next period. The banking systems of the transition countries 
are not able to exploit the efficiency increase, in terms of market share gain, as 
much as the banks in European developed countries. This may be due to higher 
concentration of the banking industry in transition countries, where the prices are 
more rigid. Moreover, we showed that income diversification is negatively related 
to market share of loans at the significant level. This means that banks that want to 
diversify income need to make a tradeoff between loan output and other earning 
assets. The banks that had undergone through the M&A during the period of the 
sample, on average, have more market share than banks that have not made any 
M&A. This concludes that bigger banks use M&A as a way to increase market 
share and ultimately exploit the market power as a result.
Despite being carefully designed and executed, our study could be further improved 
and sophisticated by some methodological improvements and employment of 
a potentially richer data set. One aspect of the improvement relates to the risk 
measurement technique where risk is measured as a standard error of the expected 
return, reflecting overall aggregate risk of a particular bank in a specific period. A 
more advance approach should instead differentiate among different types of risk, 
like for example credit risk, market risk, foreign exchange risk etc., which could 
result in a more precise measurement how different types of risk affect market 
share of banks. We see the most serious obstacle for this kind of the extension in 
the limited availability of much more detailed data, while conceptually, the study 
could be designed in a similar way as our analysis. The second potential suggestion 
for further research is related to the approach typically used in the literature for 
market share measurement. Namely, market share variables used in most of the 
studies and in our analysis take into account only three the most common balance 
sheet categories, i.e. total assets, loans and deposits, while in reality market share 
and market power of an individual bank can also be expressed by some other 
parameters reflecting more transactional services provided by the banks for their 
customers (e.g. payment services). Again, also in this case limited availability of 
data represents an obstacle for this kind of extension of the analysis.
These results should be handled with care by policy makers. The results conclude 
that higher concentration may come through the risk taking, efficiency and M&A 
decisions. However, the policies should not discourage the concentration as long as 
efficiency plays greater role in concentration and the risk is within the acceptable 
boundaries of the prudential regulation. Moreover, the policies that allow the 
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efficient banks to take advantage of being efficient by gaining more market share 
might encourage banks to increase efficiency, especially the policies in transition 
countries.
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Troškovna učinkovitost i rizik kao odrednice tržišnog udjela u bankarstvu: 
empirijski dokazi starih i novih država članica Europske unije i zemalja 
kandidata
Bashkim Nurboja1, Marko Košak2
Sažetak
U ovom članku istražuje se kako troškovna učinkovitost i rizik utječu na tržišni 
udio u europskom bankarskom sektoru. Analiza je motivirana poznatom hipotezom 
učinkovitosti i teorijom strukture-vođenja-uspješnosti. Hipoteza je da su 
poboljšana učinkovitost i pojačani rizik banke povezani s rastom tržišnog udjela 
banke. U odnosu na ostala istraživanja, u ovoj analizi uključen je rizik kao 
odrednica tržišnog udjela. U istraživanju se koriste godišnji podaci za 36 banaka 
iz europskih zemalja u razdoblju od 2007. do 2015. godine. Rezultati pokazuju da 
su rizik i učinkovitost pozitivno povezani s tržišnim udjelom imovine, zajmova i 
depozita. Nadalje, istraživanjem je utvrđeno da su banke u tranzicijskim zemljama 
bile manje uspješne u pretvaranju prednosti u pogledu troškovne učinkovitosti u 
povećanje tržišnih udjela od banaka u razvijenim europskim zemljama. Empirijski 
model je procijenjen korištenjem GMM metode kako bi se uzela u obzir dinamička 
priroda istraživanih komponenti te s ciljem zaobilaženja problema endogenosti.
Ključne riječi: bankovna učinkovitost, rizik, tržišni udio
JEL klasifikacija: G21, L22
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Apendices
Appendix 1: Methodology for recovering the risk variable
This methodology was used according to Hughes et al. (1996) and Kotter 
(2008). Managers maximise utility by choosing optima profit and input demand.
Let π denote after tax profit. Technology stipulates the production plan of output 
quantities y, input quantities x, and capital k. The output prices are denoted by p. 
Managers form beliefs conditional on future states of the world s as interaction with 
the plan production (y, x, p, k) to determine profit π = (y, x, p, k|s). Moreover, they 
form a subjective distribution of the prevailing states s. Therefore, this creates the 
conditional probability distribution of profit to be realised f = (π|y, x, p, k, s). So, 
the approach to consider risk would be by defining utility as expected profit and 
its standard deviation U(E(π), S(π)). Since this risk modeling would not reveal the 
source of uncertainty which determines S(π), Hughes et al. (1996) suggested that 
production plan (y, x, p, k) can influence the utility.
Generalized Managerial Utility function, managers maximize utility U(π, y, x, p, k) 
subject to transformation functionof the form T(y, x, k) and the rank preferences of 
the profit. Let m denote income from sources other than output y. In addition, let t 
be tax rate on profit so that pπ = 1/(1 – t) depicts the price of after tax profit in terms 
of before tax profit. Then, nominal before tax accounting profit is given as:
 (1)
under the assumption of perfect competition in input and output markets. This 
ensures comparability with the case of the cost efficiency. Therefore, we write 
Utility maximisation problem:max ( )
  
(2)
Solving this maximization problem for π and xi, we get the most preferred profit 
function and the most preferred input demand function:
∗ ∗( )   (3)
∗ ∗( )  (4)
Where υ is a vector of the price environment of the bank υ = (w, p, pπ). The profit 
function π* is not necessary a profit maximising one from the traditional approach. 
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Risk preferences are recovered from observed choices of production plans that 
banks has made. While the most preferred profit demand function is conditional 
on risk preferences we use it to estimate the benchmark frontier and to derive 
efficiency estimates.
Empirical specification
Since the equation (1) is not possible to estimate because of the unknown 
functional form and utility is not observable. In the context of banking firm, we 
estimate most preferred profit function and input demand function to gain insight 
into the preferences of bank managers. This is done by using the techniques 
from consumer theory that analysis the preferences for goods on basis of their 
expenditure and budget data. Hughes and Moon (1995) adopted Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AID) that was developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) by 
using some Microeconomics techniques; first, the dual relation between the utility 
maximization problem (UMP) and the expenditure minimisation problem (EMP); 
second, the inverse relation of indirect utility and the expenditure function. 
Duality allows restating equation (1) as minimization problem:min ( ) = 0, 
  
(5)
U0 is the fixed level of utility. Solving the optimisation problem we get most 
preferred profit πu(y, υ, k, U0) and input demand function xu(y, υ, z, U0). According 
to Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) we can substitute the indirect utility function 
V(y, υ, m, k) for U0 and then we have optimal demand functions as ( ) ∗( )   (6)( ) ∗( )  (7)
Where x*(‧) and π*(‧) are the demand functions given in equation (3) and (4) 
and V(‧) depicts the indirect utility function. In the following we use the inverse 
relationship between indirect utility and the expenditure function, so by substitution 
we get: ( )  (8)
Following, the AID in this case is not used to estimate demanded quantities 
directly. Instead, here we use Sheppard’s Lemma to derive budget shares from the 
expenditure function. In Hughes et al. (1996) they adopted AID and define it as:
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(∙) ( y )( w ) p
 
(9)
Where lnP is the price index employed in the AID. Since the initial suggestionof 
Deaton and Muehlbauer (1980) many application in the consumer literature used 
the functional form of a translog for the price index. Therefore, we continue to use 
a translog functional form for the price index. Moreover, this functional form will 
allow a comparison with the cost minimising model. So, lnP is defined as 





Note that price of each output is not included. Instead we use an average price p~. 
The Hughes et al. (1996) showed that this help to conserve on degrees of freedom. 
Moreover, income earned per output is not readily available for transition countries.
In the following we derive share equation by applying Sheppard’s Lemma to 
equation (9). We know that partial derivatives of the expenditure function with 
respect to goods’ price are equal to respective budget shares. Knowing this we 
substitute the indirect utility function for the given utility U0 into the derivatives 
 and . Substituting (8) into (9) and solving for utility, we get the indirect 
utility function as:
(∙) = ln( )(∏ ) (∏ )  (11)
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The share equation for input demand and profit for a given level of utility are then 
depicted by:
= = [ln( )+ +  [ln( )   (12)
and
= = ( )  ( ) .  
(13)
According to the model in Deaton and Muehlbauer (1980) the parameters on 
consumed goods’ prices are defined as: 
 
= 12 ( ∗ ∗ ) = 12 ∗ ∗ )  and 
 
= 12 ( ∗ ) = 12 ∗ ∗ ) 
Moreover, several restrictions are imposed on the model due to symmetry and 
homogeneity:
for all and and and  (14)
The following restriction are:
 
(15a)
+ = 1,                   
 
(15b)
+ = 0,                
 
(15c)
+ = 0,                 
 
(15d)
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+ = 0,                          
 
(15e)
+ = 0,                    
 
(15f)
+ = 0,                       
 
(15g)
12 + 12 + + 12 + = 0.  
 
(15h)
To impose homogeneity we have to divide all prices by one of the goods’ price, 
for simplicity, the Kotter (2006) suggests the price of physical capital. The last of 
restriction we need because the share derived from dual function must sum to one. 
The following restrictions are:
= 1,                                             
 
(16a)
= 0,                                             
 
(16b)
= 0,                                             
 
(16c)
= 0,                                             
 
(16d)
= 0,                                             
 
(16e)





To impose the adding up restrictions the share equation of demand for physical 
capital is dropped from system. Thus, we are left with system of three equations. 
After substituting the price index lnP from equation (10) into share equations (12) 
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and (13) and collecting terms, the final system results. The collection of the term 
can be done with nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression equation (nlSURE). 
From here we follow Hughes et al. (1996) method and we use equation (13) to 
measure expected return and risk. Expected return on equity is the predicted profit 
divided by financial capital, ER = . Whereas, Risk, is measured as a standard
error of the expected return, 
( )).
Appendix 2: Recovering cost efficiency variable 
The stochastic frontier approach (SFA) was used to recover cost efficiency scores, 
we have used Battes and Coelli (1995) model technique. The SFA approach 
allows for random errors, which diminishes the problem with measurement 
errors (Staikouras, Mamatzakis, & Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 2008). The distance 
from frontier will reflect the bank cost efficiency of all banks relative to the ‘best 
practice’ bank. We have included the controls for cross-country differences in the 
economic and financial environment, respectively, GDP and total banking assets to 
GDP. These differences may play a role in efficiency terms (Dietsch & Lozano-
Vivas, 2000).
In following we present a model:( ) where  (1)
TCit stands for bank total costs for bank i at year t, P represents vector of input 
prices, Y represents outputs of banks, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated 
and εit contains υit which is assumed to be normally distributed around the frontier 
υi ~ N(0, +σ2v), which captures unobserved phenomena, and uit is assumed as the 
truncated normal distribution ui ~ N(0, +σ2u), which captures inefficiency, and is 
independent of υi. 
In our empirical specification we used translog function, which was used by many 
authors, example Fries & Taci (2005) and Nurboja & Košak (2017).
+ + + 12 +  12 +
+ + + 12 +  12 +
 
(2)
After running the estimation we have saved efficiency scores and we used it as 
variable in our models for market share.
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MS Deposits 0.981* 1.000
MS Loans 0.984* 0.970* 1.000
Risk 0.113* 0.097* 0.102* 1.000
Efficiency 0.048* 0.043* 0.056* -0.015 1.000
Income 
Diversification
-0.012* -0.014* -0.051* 0.080* -0.228* 1.000
GDP -0.137* -0.141* -0.140* 0.227* 0.007* 0.178* 1.000
Assets to GDP -0.085* -0.090 -0.082 0.264* 0.111* 0.153* 0.542 1.000
HHI Assets 0.280* 0.300* 0.291* 0.083 0.165* 0.010 -0.041* 0.151* 1.000
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Appendix 4: No. of M&A per country during the period 2007–2015
Country No. M&A Year of the M&A
Albania 1 2008
Austria 1 2010
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 2008
Finland 1 2010
Germany 4 2009, 2010, 2014
Greece 3 2012, 2015
Netherlands 1 2010
Poland 2 2013, 2014
Turkey 2 2009, 2011
United Kingdom 1 2009
Note: These M&A are done within the country.
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1 ALBANIA 0 1
2 AUSTRIA 1 0
3 BELGIUM 1 0
4 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 0 1
5 BULGARIA 0 1
6 CROATIA 0 1
7 CYPRUS 1 0
8 CZECH REPUBLIC 0 1
9 DENMARK 1 0
10 FINLAND 1 0
11 FRANCE 1 0
12 GERMANY 1 0
13 GREECE 1 0
14 HUNGARY 0 1
15 ICELAND 1 0
16 IRELAND 1 0
17 ITALY 1 0
18 KOSOVO 0 1
19 LATVIA 0 1
20 LITHUANIA 0 1
21 MACEDONIA (FYROM) 0 1
22 MONTENEGRO 0 1
23 NETHERLANDS 1 0
24 NORWAY 1 0
25 POLAND 0 1
26 PORTUGAL 1 0
27 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 0 1
28 ROMANIA 0 1
29 SERBIA 0 1
30 SLOVAKIA 0 1
31 SLOVENIA 0 1
32 SPAIN 1 0
33 SWEDEN 1 0
34 SWITZERLAND 1 0
35 TURKEY 1 0
36 UNITED KINGDOM 1 0
European developed countries 19
Transition countries 17
Note: When we compare transition countries with European developed countries we use as 
benchmark European developed countries. 
